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Játtað í: 2018 Granskingarøki: Samfelag Verkætlanarslag: Ph.d.-verkætlan Verkætlanarheiti: Framsøgufrælsi og haturstala Játtanarnummar: 0235 Verkætlanarleiðari: Sigri Gaini Stovnur/virki: Søgu og Samfelagsdeildin á Fróðskaparsetrinum Aðrir luttakarar: Sune Lægaard (Supervisor) & Hans Andrias Sølvará (Supervisor) Verkætlanarskeið: Planned: 01.09.2018-30.08.2021 Actual: 01.09.2018-06.05.2024 Samlaður kostnaður: kr. 1.871.330 Stuðul úr Granskingargrunninum: kr. 1.100.000 Verkætlanarlýsing: Original Bør der være en racismeparagraf? Dette er kernespørgsmålet i projektet, der ud fra en etisk og filosofisk vinkel behandler paradokset ytringsfrihed >< begrænsninger af ytringsfriheden – med særligt fokus på § 266b. Paragraffen har i de seneste mange år fået megen opmærksomhed, især i kølvandet på “Muhammed-krisen” i 2005-2006. De enormt kraftige reaktioner, Muhammed-tegningerne vakte, fik mange til at reagere med skepsis overfor paragraffen. For er det ikke en undergravelse af vores demokratiske frihedsrettigheder, at der findes restriktioner ved vores ytringsfrihed? Og er det ikke et paradoks, at man ved rettens gang kan sigte demokratiske borgere for at have ytret sig – når nu ytringsfriheden er en af grundstenene i et demokrati? På den anden side er der den enorme udbredelse af internettet, samt kendsgerningen, at alle borgere herigennem har fået en røst. Imamers hadprædikener og politikeres racistiske udtalelser på de sociale medier har bl.a. givet liv til debatten, for kommer racismeparagraffen ikke netop til sin ret i disse situationer, hvor især unge mennesker er i fare for at blive påvirket af menneskefiendske og racistiske menneskesyn – hvilket kan føre til eskalerende hatespeech, samt mulige hatecrimes? Der har i den offentlige debat manglet en dybere teoretisk diskussion, der vurderer de forskellige argumenter for eller imod at beholde racismeparagraffen. Min tese er, at man ikke kan afklare, om paragraffen er berettiget eller ej, uden at inddrage de konsekvenser, paragraffen rent faktisk medfører: Der vil således blive set på den teoretiske og etiske diskussion af de mest centrale argumenter og diskuteret, hvorvidt de taler for eller imod at beholde racismeparagraffen. Den etiske metode “reflekterede ligevægtsovervejelser” vil indgå som en central del af behandlingen – og derudover vil kriminaliseringsteori, samt de forskellige etiske retninger også blive inddraget. Slutteligt vil aktuel empiri, der peger på diverse konsekvenser af paragraffen, også blive benyttet (men der vil ikke blive udført empiriske undersøgelser). Undersøgelserne af paragraffens evt.berettigelse vil være specifikt i regi af Danmark og Færøerne, da det vil være umuligt at generalisere argumenterne, grundet forskellige landes ulige omstændigheder, bl.a. i forhold til befolkningsgrupper, nationale konflikter, udbredelse af racisme, retorik o.s.v. Final The PhD-thesis is a political-philosophical and theoretical work which consists of an introduction and three scientific articles which have all been published: ‘The Individual Consequences of Hate Speech — A Comparison of Defamation and Hate Speech/Group Libel’ (Published in Sofia Philosophical Review, 2022) ‘Universities and Other Institutions — not Hate Speech Laws — are a Threat to Political Speech’ (Published in Etikk i praksis, 2022) ‘Democratic Formation as the Response to a Growing Cancel Culture (Published in ATHENA — Critical lnquieries in Law’, Philosophy and Globalization, 2023) The main findings/the original contribution of the PhD-thesis thesis lies in the presentation of three main philosophical hypotheses and a new argument, namely ‘The argument from Democratic Formation’ which combines well-known viewpoints that usually stand in opposition to one another in the freedom of speech vs hate speech discussion. In my first article ‘The Individual Consequences of Hate Speech — A Comparison of Defamation and Hate Speech/Group Libel’, I argue that the consequences from being a victim of hate speech — which means being a member of a minority group that is exposed to hate speech - are very similar to the consequences from being a victim of (personal) defamation. The legal and philosophical rationalization for passing laws against defamation are first, that defamation causes harm to its victims and second, that it causes societal instability — or, said in an old fashioned way: it causes ‘a breach of the peace’. I argue that hate speech also causes its victims harm —and often a quite similar harm to that experienced by the victims of defamation. Further, I argue that hate speech often also leads to a breach of the societal peace. Hence, the logic of the argumentation is that if the concequences are very similar in the cases of (personal) defamation and hate speech, then this should lead us to either the passing of hate speech laws where they are not in place yet or it should lead to the abrogation of defamation laws. Knowing that both defamation and hate speech do lead to harm to their victims, however, I argue/or the passing of hate speech laws. The legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has also compared defamation with hate speech and argued that both of these forms of speech should be illegal. Waldron's and my own argumentation do however rest on different reasoning. Whereas Waldron argues that defamation damages an individual“s reputation while hate speech violates the soCial standing of the members of minorities, I stress that both defamation and hate speech damage their victims’ reputations and that the tangible consequences from that are more similar than is normally imagined. In the article I present a couple of hypothetical cases illustrating these similar consequences — and I draw, first and foremost on the the well-known English liberal philosopher, John Stuart Mill's harm principle in the argumentation of this article. In my second article ‘Universities and other Institutions — not Hate Speech Laws —are a threat to Freedom of Political Speech’ I argue that the modern phenomenon of cancel culture is a bigger threat to freedom of political speech than laws against hate speech are. My hypothesis in this article is that the fact that the US does not have any hate speech laws has — ironically — played a major part in the growing demands for censorship and various restrictions on speech at US institutions, first and foremost at US Universities. These demands are a central part of the phenomenon of modern cancel culture. I argue that the passing of hate speech laws can contribute to simultaneouslv uphold two of the main democratic principles in liberal democracy: Namely, firstly, it can uphold the protection of members of minorities, meaning the protection from being victims of coarsely degrading speech, that is from being victims of hate speech. And secondly, the passing of hate speech laws can contribute to defending society against the censorship of specific — often, controversial — political opinions. This also means it can contribute to the rejection of cancel culture. The reason that hate speech laws can work as a defense against censorship and other forms of cancel culture is that with hate speech laws in place, one can point to the laws when people are truly victims of hate speech according to the hate speech laws — but at the same time, one can reject demands for restricting political speech, which does not fall under the label of hate speech. In my third article ‘Democratic Formation as the Response to a Growing Cancel Culture’, I present a new argument: The argument from democratic formation. This argument seeks to combine two opposing sides of the freedom of speech discussion, namely the side which defends freedom of political speech, on the one hand, and the side which defends hate speech legislation, on the other hand. The argument from democratic formation holds that what I call the democratic formation of citizens leads to the insight and realization that in order to uphold freedom of political speech one cannot, under any circumstances, accept restrictions on political speech as is seen through the practice of contemporary cancel culture. And moreover, that one can neither accept that members of minorities are victims of harassment and discrimination through hate speech. Hence, the argument from democratic formation combines two viewpoints, which usually stand in opposition to one another, into one (merged) argument — which argues in defense of hate speech legislation — but which at the same time argues against restrictions of political speech (and cancel culture). The argument from democratic formation does represent a balancing approach to freedom of speech - but, importantly, it does so in a non-conventional way, since it, contrary to most other arguments which defend hate speech legislation, additionaly emphasizes the crucial importance of freedom of political speech.The argument from democratic formation, thus, seeks to appeal to both those who traditionally defend hate speech legislation as well as to those who traditionally oppose hate speech legislation on the basis of freedom of political speech. So what exactly is democratic formation* Democratic formation covers what I hold is needed in order to uphold a sustainable liberal democracy. Democratic formation encompasses the education — in the word's broadest possible definition — of citizens in democratic thinking and being. With the democratic formation of citizens follows an understanding that if one does not uphold core democratic values and rights, which are founded on the Enlightenment ideas (of democracy), democracy will inevitably decline. The core of democratic formation which is also the premise for upholding liberal democracy is the capacity for critical thinking. I hold that without this capacity among its citizens, liberal democracy will weaken since the capacity for critical thinking is the anti-thesis to reproducing other people's opinions and ideas —and — perhaps even more importantly — with a developed critical thought, one realizes that other people's opinions (which might be controversial — or just differ from one's own) must be validated and not restricted or cancelled. The realization of this lies, first and foremost, in the understanding that if one, oneself, is to have the freedom to express oneself critically, then it must follow that others, likewise, have that same right too.I hold that democratic formation is a necessary component for a functioning liberal democracy and further, that democratic formation must build on the Enlightenment ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity. I argue that if one compromises these values, e.g. by not prioritizing democratic formation in the educational system, one is bound to face a decline in democratic awareness — something which leads to undemocratic practices such as are seen through cancel culture. Støða: Liðug Avrik: PhD thesis defended on 6 May 2024. Title: Freedom of Speech, Hate Speech and Democratic Formation: on the double function of hate speech legislation and its relation to freedom of political speech. See PURE << Back |
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