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Játtað í: 2010 Granskingarøki: Samfelag Verkætlanarslag: Ph.d.verkætlan Verkætlanarheiti: Strategic Management of Shared Fish Stocks Applied to the Pelagic Complex in the North East Atlantic. Játtanarnummar: 0513 Verkætlanarleiðari: Hans Ellefsen Stovnur/virki: Havstovuni/Syddansk Universitet Verkætlanarskeið: 01.01.2011 - 01.12.2012 Samlaður kostnaður: 910.157 DKK Stuðul úr Granskingargrunninum: 600.000 DKK Verkætlanarlýsing: Original: In the Faroe Islands, the public has been amply supplied with news about the mackerel throughout 2010. The reason for this being that the Faroese - in the end - sat their own quota for the fishery of this pelagic species, the mackerel. This PhD project will look into and behind the issue to see what it is all about, aiming at coming up with some solutions to the conflict(s). Overall, the project investigates the stability over time of the agreements made on shared fish stocks between coastal states. The case studied comprises agreements on the shared pelagic fish stocks mackerel, blue whiting and Norwegian Spring Spawning (NSS) herring in the North East Atlantic Ocean. The project is important not only for the Faroe Islands, but for the large region around the North East Atlantic Ocean as well. Even though the significance for this large area is small in the big picture, it has great relevance and importance locally for most of the region’s coastal areas. The Faroe Islands is a community with a high dependence on fisheries. Over 95% of the Faroese exports of goods are fisheries products. Around 22% of the Faroese GDP is produced in the fisheries sector (www.hagstova.fo). This is extraordinarily high compared to other countries. The Faroese fishing industry is dependent on agreements with other nations, especially agreements on shared pelagic fish stocks in the North East Atlantic. Around 40% of the total fish landing value stems from these agreements. The Faroese dependence on these agreements is greater than that of any of the other nations involved in the agreements - also when compared to fisheries sectors in other countries - so it is of great importance to the Faroe Islands that the agreements between the coastal states are stable over time. Otherwise, fishing conditions will be less than optimal, or, in the worst-case scenario, lead to depleted stocks. The project will mostly focus on what happens after the international fisheries agreements are established and what to do when the circumstances change, in particular if the migration of fish stocks changes. This part of the issue has not gained so much attention yet in the relevant literature. This project will also look at alternative tools for sharing fisheries resources. This project will produce three-four articles to be published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The first article will be a review article (most likely not published). The second article will analyze the effects of migration change on sharing the mackerel stock; more specifically, this article will look at the case when Iceland started fishing mackerel in 2007, even though they were not part of the mackerel agreement. The third article will aim to establish whether or not it is possible to create dynamic sharing rules concerning the fish stocks so that the shares can change in response to changes in migration patterns. The fourth article will deal with the possibility of combining the three above-mentioned species (mackerel, blue whiting and NSS herring) into one agreement, for the purpose of achieving more stable conditions. Final: The objective of this project was to examine the stability of agreements about shared fish stocks entered into between coastal states and to investigate how these agreements may be made more stable. To illustrate the problems encountered by such agreements, I conducted a case study regarding pelagic fishing resources in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, which has been called the Pelagic Complex. This case study necessarily involves questions relating to the coastal states of the EU, Norway, Iceland, Russia, and the Faroe Islands insofar as they share the following pelagic resources: Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus), Norwegian Spring Spawning herring (Clupea harengus), and blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou). Although the standard of management in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean is advanced compared to other areas in the world, there are still significant problems to be resolved. Specifically, mackerel fishing has been in dispute in recent years because the number of parties sharing this resource has increased by one (Iceland); the agreement has been strained to such an extent that it collapsed in 2010. This thesis comprises four essays that address the problems of several parties sharing a resource. The first essay is a literature review in which the literature on game theory usage in fisheries economics is compared to the literature on game theory usage in international environmental agreements. The second essay utilizes a static model to examine what players in the mackerel agreement should do in the event of an extra player entering into the agreement. The third essay examines what might be achieved if the agreements were bundled into one agreement instead of being separate agreements, which is also called issue linkage. Finally, the fourth essay re-considers the case of the mackerel in a more dynamic model in which the original players are considered one player that may deter the entry of a new player by keeping the stock under a certain threshold. A variety of results emerge from the four essays that compose this thesis. The first essay shows that much may be learned from the international environmental agreements literature; in particular, game theorists in fisheries economics could learn to build dynamic models and to make real transfers in the form of issue linkage. In the second and fourth essays, we note that a change in migration patterns may put significant stress on the mackerel agreement. In these two essays, we also see that smaller players have less incentive to preserve the stock, which makes them more likely to break out of an agreement affecting the stability of the agreement. On the other hand, the third essay shows that linking issues can stabilize agreements. Støða: Liðug Avrik: Scientific articles, books, thesis etc. The thesis is called: - ‘Essays on Strategic Management of Shared Fish Stocks Applied to the Pelagic Complex in the North East Atlantic’ it comprises of four scientfic papers. One of these is published in: - Ellefsen, H. 2013a The Stability of Fishing Agreements with Entry: The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel, Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 3:No 1–2, pp 67-95. Reports that I have been part of: - Nielsen, M., P. Andersen, L. Ravensbeck, F. M. Laugesen, J. Andersen, D. M. Kristoffersen, S. Reithe, J. Nilssen and H. Ellefsen, 2010. Socio-Economic Return of Pelagic Fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean (in Danish). Nordic council. Theme North 2010:573. - Ellefsen, H. 2010. Joint fleet – the way to a more effective fisheries in the North East Atlantic. NORA report 2011/1 Newspaper articles etc. (in Faroese): - Mið og Magn nr. 5 2010, grein - Sjóvarrmál 2010, grein - Innslag í D&V januar 2012, samrøða í sambandi við rullandi fiskiloyvir - Framløga á Fiskivinnugranskingardegnum 2012, um fyribils granskingarúrslit - Vitan Februar 2012, útvarpssending, um tilfeingisrentu í fiskivinnuni, spælteori, oa. ísv. mína gransking - Bloggur um mína gransking á heimasíðuni hjá fróðskaparfelagnum Februar 2012 - Framløga á Vísundavøkuni september 2012, um fyribils granskingarúrslit - Innslag í útvarpinum november 2012 um avtalur um pelagiskan fiskastovnar << Back |
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